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Abstract
What role do individual modes of transportation play in international trade? To
study this question, I develop a model of international trade that incorporates a
role for transportation and thus allows me to study mode-specific trade flows. I use
a novel data set to estimate the complete model for a sample of 79 countries dis-
tinguishing air, sea, and surface transportation. The estimated model implies that
surface transportation is mostly used for trade over short distances, whereas air
and sea transportation dominate long-distance trade. Furthermore, the different
modes of transportation display a high degree of substitutability. Using counter-
factual analysis I show the implications for the roles played by the different modes
of transportation. Long-distance modes are more important for poor countries be-
cause in order for them to realize gains from trade they need access to technologi-
cally advanced but far-away markets. Rich countries, on the other hand, can substi-
tute long-distance trade more easily for trade with neighboring countries without
changing the gains from trade much. As a consequence, reducing the estimated
asymmetries in mode-specific trade costs for only one long-distance mode, either
air or sea, can reduce income differences in the sample by about 35%.
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DEFYING GRAVITY
1. Introduction
For many countries, transportation related charges have become a larger obstacle to
realizing further gains from trade than tariffs. Figure 1 shows that almost all coun-
tries importing into the US face higher transportation charges than tariffs. The aver-
age ratio of transportation charges to tariffs in the sample is 3.2. As a consequence of
this, World Bank (2009) argues for investments in transportation infrastructure to lower
these transportation mode-specific trade barriers. In 2010, the World Bank invested $ 9
billion dollars or 15% of its total lending into such infrastructure projects.
But quantitative models of international trade are largely silent on the interaction
of trade and transportation. These models generally assume that there is just an aggre-
gate trade cost to be paid if two countries engage in trade.1 Therefore, these models
cannot be used to study the effects of changes in transportation mode-specific trade
costs on trade and, ultimately, welfare. In particular, they cannot be used to under-
stand the returns to the infrastructure investments meant to decrease transportation
mode-specific trade barriers.
In this paper, I develop a model of international trade that incorporates a role for
the mode of transportation and thus allows to address the implications of change in
mode-specific trade costs. I then use this model to study the role different modes of
transportation play in international trade. The framework rests on the static multi-
country model of Ricardian comparative advantage developed in Eaton and Kortum
(2002). There are two sectors: a final good sector that produces a non-traded con-
sumption good and an intermediate good sector producing a continuum of tradeable
varieties used in the production of the final good. Each country can produce each in-
termediate variety choosing from a menu of available production technologies. Each
productivity on the menu corresponds to a mode of transportation with which the good
can be exported. Trading goods between countries is subject to iceberg trade costs
where these trade costs can differ across the different modes of transportation. As in
standard Ricardian models an importer chooses the minimal price when deciding from
where to source a good. However, in my model an importer can choose both the source
country and the mode of transportation when choosing the minimal price, whereas
standard models only allow a choice of the exporting country. Allowing for the choice
of the mode of transportation allows me to study mode-specific trade flows and assess
the implications of changing mode-specific trade costs.
The modelling approach taken allows me to incorporate an arbitrary number of
transportation modes, whereas the previous literature has only considered the case of
1See, for example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Chaney (2008).
1
DEFYING GRAVITY
two modes (cf. Harrigan (2009)). This generalization turns out to be important because
the data set I use to estimate the complete model suggests to distinguish at least three
different modes. This data set reports mode-specific bilateral manufacturing trade
flows for a sample of 79 countries; the sample year is 2005. The three different modes of
transportation I distinguish are air, vessel, and surface transportation. Relative to mod-
els of aggregate trade flows the estimation of the model is complicated due to the fact
that the gravity equation in the model is non-linear in the mode-specific trade costs.
As a consequence, I jointly estimate the model’s system of equations using non-linear
least squares. In the estimation, the mode-specific trade cost functions are allowed to
differ along two dimensions. On the one hand the coefficients on geographic controls
like distance can differ: for example, the distance elasticities of air and surface trans-
portation are not restricted to be identical. On the other hand, the geographic controls
entering the trade cost functions can differ: the distance travelled by a ship transport-
ing goods from, say, Germany to Italy is much larger than the distance flown by an
airplane between the same countries. In addition, I allow for a mode- and country-
specific exporter fixed effect similar to Waugh (2010). The differences in the trade cost
functions across the different modes of transportation are crucial in matching mode-
specific trade flows. It turns out that the distance elasticity of surface transportation is
by far the largest, and that the cost of air transportation barely rises in distance. Fur-
thermore, the large contiguity effect usually found in the literature is mostly caused
by surface transportation; being contiguous to a country has a much smaller effect on
vessel transportation and barely any on air transportation.
To further highlight the role played by different modes of transportation I calculate
the share of gains from trade attributable to each individual mode. That is, I calculate
the loss in gains from trade if a given mode was not available. The average welfare loss
for shutting off trade by sea is with 2.9% largest, followed by surface transportation with
an average loss of 2.4%. Air transportation is the least important one with an average
loss of 0.8%. All these losses, however, are small compared to the average loss of 11.1%
entailed in a move to autarky. The reason is that modes are strongly substitutable for
each other. Another interesting feature is that this counterfactual highlights the impli-
cations of the geographic distribution of technology levels: on the globe, high technol-
ogy countries are mostly clustered together and so are low technology countries. As
a consequence, access to long-distance modes of transportation like trading by sea is
more important for poor countries than for rich countries. On the other hand, access
to surface transportation is more important for rich countries than for poor countries.
I then use the model to conduct another counterfactual, aimed at investigating
the role of transportation in reducing income differences. Recently, Waugh (2010) has
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shown that the systematic asymmetries in aggregate trade costs explain up to 30% of
income differences in the country sample he uses. I use the model to investigate the
extent to which the asymmetries in mode-specific trade costs can reduce income dif-
ferences. The results show that reducing the asymmetries in air or sea transportation
alone can reduce income differences by about 35%. To put this number into perspec-
tive, the income differences are reduced by 60% when moving to free trade. The reason
for this strong role played by a single mode of transportation in realizing gains from
trade is, again, the substitutability among the modes estimated in the model.
The arguments in this paper contribute to the large literature that tries to determine
the many different sources through which gains from trade arise. Most closely related
are Fogel (1964) and Donaldson (2008) in that they also evaluate the gains arising from
different means of transportation. Fogel (1964) investigates the effect of the railroads
connecting the US east and west coast that were built in the 19th century and concludes
that they did not lead to a significant increase in trade flows. Instead, they mostly led to
substitutions away from the system of inland waterways used before to the newly built
railroads. Donaldson (2008) investigates the effect of the railroads built by the British in
19th century India. He concludes that the railroads led to a considerable welfare gain
and that about 90% of these gains occurred as gains from trade. As in these papers,
I concentrate on the role played by different modes of transportation in trade. The
difference is that I do not concentrate on a particular infrastructure project but provide
a framework in which one can discuss the effects of different infrastructure projects
more generally.
By estimating mode-specific trade cost functions the paper also contributes to the
large literature that studies the determinants of international trade costs. Anderson
and van Wincoop (2004) provide an excellent recent survey of this literature. Most of
the literature studies aggregate trade costs between countries and evaluates their deter-
minants. One of the exceptions that study mode-specific trade costs is Hummels (2001)
who develops an empirical discrete choice model of mode-specific trade flows to deter-
mine the effect of delivery time on trade costs. He estimates his model using US import
data and finds that each day saved in shipping time is worth about 0.8% of the value of
the shipment. However, his approach does not allow one to estimate complete bilateral
trade cost functions. Furthermore, since he does not specify a full general equilibrium
model it is impossible to judge the contributions of individual modes to the overall
gains from trade. Harrigan (2009) develops a complete model of mode-specific trade
flows. His main concern is with the degree to which faster transportation can act as
a source of comparative advantage. He derives a set of implications from the model
and tests them using US import data. However, as mentioned above his modelling ap-
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proach does not generalize to more than two modes. But the quantitative importance
of multiple modes is an important feature of the data set I use to estimate my model.
The aim in modelling mode-specific trade flows in an explicit general equilibrium
setting is to establish a link between mode-specific trade costs and welfare. Such a
model closes a gap in two other strands of the literature. First, there are many studies
that investigate the link between trade costs and transportation infrastructure. They
generally find that improving transportation infrastructure lowers mode-specific trade
costs. For example, Clark, Dollar, and Micco (2004) use micro data from the U.S. Im-
port Waterborne Databank to investigate the determinants of maritime transport costs.
They conclude that improving port efficiency from the 25th to the 75th percentile of
their efficiency index decreases shipping costs by 12%. Another example is Limao and
Venables (2001). They investigate the impact of infrastructure on trade costs and in-
fer that dropping from the median to the 75th percentile on the distribution of infras-
tructure quality raises transport costs by 12%. But since these studies do not spec-
ify a general equilibrium model of mode-specific trade flows, they are unable to link
the reduction in mode-specific trade costs to welfare, which is the natural measure for
judging investment projects, for example. The model presented in this paper fills this
gap by providing just such a link. The only other model I am aware of that links infras-
tructure improvements to welfare gains is Donaldson (2008), already mentioned above.
However, one property of his model is that all trade between two regions uses the ex-
act same mode of transportation. That is to say, there is exactly one cost-minimizing
choice between to regions. But looking at modern trade flows between two countries,
it is evident that most country pairs employ a mixture of different modes of transporta-
tion. The model developed in this paper explicitly incorporates such mode-specific
mixtures.
The other part of the literature where a link between mode-specific trade costs and
welfare is of interest is a small literature that tries to determine the effects of stronger
competition among international carriers on international trade costs. Hummels, Lu-
govskyy, and Skiba (2009) investigate the role of shipping cartels in inhibiting interna-
tional trade. They find that the market power exerted by shippers explains a large part
of the variation in trade costs. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that reduc-
ing the market power would boost trade volumes by 6% to 15%. Micco and Serebrisky
(2006) investigate the role of increased competition in international air transportation
and the relation to air shipping costs. They investigate open-skies agreements (OSAs)
that liberalize air transportation markets and conclude that these agreements reduce
air shipping costs by about 9% for developed countries. They also find that for less de-
veloped countries these OSAs do not have a discernible cost effect. From a normative
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perspective, the ultimate object of interest in waging whether to liberalize shipping car-
tels or the aviation industry should be the change in a country’s welfare. With the help
of the model developed in this paper, it is possible to estimate these welfare gains and
determine the desirability of deregulation. Furthermore, the model offers a potential
explanation for the different effects of OSAs on developed and developing countries.
2. The Empirics of Mode-Specific Trade Flows
In this section I first introduce the data used in the paper. To the best of my knowledge,
the enlarged data set on mode-specific trade flows has not been used before in the
literature. I then highlight four properties of the data that will guide the development
of the structural model and provide insights into the identification of some of the key
parameters.
2.1. The Data
To study mode-specific trade flows in a multi-country setting I have to go beyond the
data set usually used for studying mode-specific questions in international trade. Al-
most all papers investigating these solely rely on the US Imports and Exports of Mer-
chandise.2 But as a consequence, the US is always on one side of the observed trade
flows, either as an importer or as an exporter. This does not allow the identification of
country specific components for any other country but the US, which makes the com-
plete specification of a general equilibrium model of international trade impossible.
Therefore, I combine this data set with a novel data set from Eurostat, the European
Union’s statistical agency. The EU data set contains all external trade flows of the 27 EU
members disaggregated by the mode of transportation. External trade flows are trade
flows between EU countries and non-EU countries. The fact that only external flows are
contained in this data set is due to the difference in customs requirements for record-
ing intra- and extra-EU trade flows. The EU data set distinguishes nine different modes
of transportation. However, to make the data set compatible with the US data, I only
use three modes: air, sea, and surface. What I call surface is thus an aggregate of the
remaining seven modes. These are trade by road, rail, inland waterways, fixed mecha-
nism, postal, and unknown mode of transportation. Fixed mechanism transportation
refers to goods that do not need external transportation, for example air planes, boats,
and trucks. In 2005, the average bilateral share of rail and road based transportation in
2See, for example, Hummels (2001), Harrigan (2009), and Hummels and Schaur (2010). Clark, Dollar,
and Micco (2004) rely on the US Waterborne Database which also only records trade with the US as one
partner.
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the category of surface based transportation was 80%.3 Thus, this category can really
be thought of as mostly reflecting trade by surface transportation.
The data on bilateral trade flows are collected from the statistical agencies of the
27 EU member countries. This gives the data set a particular structure, depicted in
figure 2. EU member countries and the US take on both the role of reporters and part-
ners, whereas all other countries in the sample are only partners. The distinction is
the valuation of the reported trade flows: imports to reporting countries are reported
including freight and insurance – what is commonly referred to as “cost, insurance,
freight” or c.i.f. – whereas exports from reporting countries are registered excluding
these additional charges. This is commonly referred to as “free alongside ship” or f.a.s.
This difference is due to the particular nature of customs forms used in international
trade: exporters are only required to report the value of the goods transported, whereas
importers also record the cost for shipping and insurance.4 The summary statistics pre-
sented in this section ignore this distinction, but the estimation procedure developed
below will take this difference into account.
As explained above, the EU data set only reports trade with external partners. There-
fore only trade flows between any two countries in different blocks in figure 2 are con-
tained in the sample but not within any one block. For example, the sample contains
the trade flows between Germany and Canada but not between Germany and Belgium.
Because of the use of both nautical and great circle distances in the estimation proce-
dure I also exclude all landlocked countries. This leaves 23 reporting countries, con-
sisting of the US and 22 European Union members. The EU countries not represented
in the sample are Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. In addition, Bel-
gium and Luxembourg have been combined into one country. There are 56 partner
countries from all parts of the world in the rest of the sample. The sample year is 2005.
Since the model developed later is based on the Ricardian idea of comparative ad-
vantage, it is best thought of as describing trade in manufactured goods. Therefore I
restrict attention to manufacturing trade flows in what follows.5
2.2. Four Properties of the Data
In this subsection I describe four properties of the data. The first two show that the
choice of the transportation mode does not solely depend on country- or good-specific
factors. The third fact demonstrates that it is in fact geography that interacts very differ-
3See Lux (2010) for a more detailed discussion of this data set.
4See Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006) for a related discussion of the difference between c.i.f. and f.a.s.
flows in international trade.
5See the data appendix for a discussion of the concordance used.
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ently with the different transportation modes. The fourth property documents changes
in mode-specific transportation charges over time that will inform the inference on the
substitutability of transportation modes.
Fact I: Countries Alone Do Not Determine the Transportation Choice
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the bilateral mode-specific shares gmni =
Xmni
Xni
in
the data set. Xmni is the spending of country n on imports from country i that are trans-
ported via mode m and Xni =
∑
mX
m
ni, where the summation is over the three modes
air, vessel, and surface. Trade by vessel is the most important mode of transportation
with an average share of just over 60%. Air transportation is the second most important
mode with a share of just over 20%. Surface transportation has an average share of al-
most 19%. The variation of these bilateral mode-specific shares reported in the table,
measured as the coefficient of variation, is large for all three modes. For air and surface
transportation the coefficient of variation is 115.6% and 137.7%, respectively. Even for
maritime trade the variation is about 50%. The first and third quartile of each share dis-
tribution are also reported and further corroborate the significant amount of variation
in mode-specific shares.
Table 1 calculates the statistics across all bilateral pairs. To understand the role of
different modes of transportation at the country-level, figures 3 to 5 plot the median
of the export share gmni per exporter and mode against the (log) GDP per capita. The
figures show that most countries use all modes of transportation for their exports and
confirm the impression from table 1. They also demonstrate the variation in the use
of different modes across different countries. Air transportation plays a bigger role in
exports of rich countries but maritime trade is more important for poor countries. Sur-
face transportation is insignificantly correlated with an exporter’s GDP per capita in the
data set.
The summary statistics show that all three modes are actively used in international
trade and that there is a lot of variation in bilateral shares. The exporter level analysis
further details this variation. It shows that the variation of the summary statistics is
not exclusively caused by variation across different countries but that there is an active
use of multiple modes of transportation even at the exporter’s level. This shows that
the composition of mode-specific trade cannot be explained solely by country specific
characteristics.
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Fact II: Goods Alone Do Not Determine the Transportation Choice
The second stylized fact concerns the question whether the goods traded determine
the choice of the mode of transportation or whether there is substitutability of modes
for a given good. Since only the US data set contains information on good-specific
trade flows, I restrict the analysis of this point to the US Exports of Merchandise. To
investigate this point, I first calculate the mode-specific trade shares of US exports per
commodity. I then compute the Herfindahl index of these mode-specific shares for
every commodity across different modes, i.e.
HI(j) =
∑
m
s(j)2m,
where
s(j)m =
x(j)m
x(j)
.
x(j)m is the value of US exports of good j that is transported by mode m and x(j) =∑
m x(j)m is the total value of US exports of good j. A good is a HS10 category. Figure
6 plots the histogram of the Herfindahl indices over commodities. The lower bound
of 1/3 represents an equal distribution of mode-specific shares for the commodity, im-
plying that the good is exported using all three modes equally. The upper bound of
one signals that all trade is concentrated in one single mode. If goods were transported
with only one mode of transportation, the histogram would show that the Herfindahl
indices for all commodities would be concentrated at one. But the histogram shows
that only just under 4% of all goods have an index of nearly one. The bulk of goods
have an index below 0.6. A trade-weighted average of these Herfindahl indices gives a
value of 0.57.
The histogram is only a count of commodities. To investigate the importance of the
goods being exported with one predominant mode and their contribution to total ex-
port values more closely, table 3 reports the share in overall US Exports that falls upon
goods that are exported with any mode-specific share – air, sea, or surface – above a
certain threshold. For example, about 0.6% of all US exports in 2005 were exported
with one mode-specific share above 99.5% and just under 5% of all exports had one
mode-specific share above 95%. Thus the vast majority of goods are not automatically
linked to a mode of transportation but rather exported with different modes of trans-
portation to different destinations, thus giving a central role to the bilateral geography.
I investigate the role of geography in shaping mode-specific trade flows in the next fact.
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Fact III: Geography Affects Transportation Modes Differently
To get a better understanding of the interaction of different modes of transportation
with geography I estimate a naive gravity regression as follows:
lnXmni = α+ α1 log
(
Yn
Nn
)
+ α2nn + α3
(
Yi
Ni
)
+ α4ni + d
k
ni + lni + bni + cni + ε
m
ni. (1)
Xmni is the value of trade between n and i that is transported by mode m, α is a con-
stant, Yk is the GDP of country k,Nk country k’s population, dkni a distance dummy, lni a
dummy for n and i speaking a common language, bni one for sharing a common border,
and cni one for being on the same continent. It is a naive gravity regression because the
value of trade between n and i by mode m potentially depends on the costs of other
alternative modes of transportation. The degree to which this matters depends on the
substitutability of different transportation modes. This naive gravity regression does
not take this substitution possibility into account, but the structural model developed
below will provide a way to do this.
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of equation (1). The results show that
richer countries trade more but that air is the mode most strongly influenced by this
effect. What is more, this effect is stronger for the exporter than for the importer for all
three modes. With respect to distance, the results show that the different modes have
very different profiles. Air is least affected by distance and surface is most strongly af-
fected by it. The other geographic controls show that being contiguous increases trade
by surface a lot but has an insignificant influence on the other two modes. Similarly,
speaking a common language does not foster trade by surface but rather trade by air
and sea. All of these effects are qualitatively in line with results from aggregate gravity
regressions. The new feature here is the quantitative variation across different modes.
The geographic controls used here are the ones commonly used as proxies for trade
costs in gravity regressions (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)). The differences
across the different modes of transportation then seem to suggest that the transporta-
tion modes have different cost profiles. Taking this together with the second fact re-
ported above leads me to model the choice of different transportation modes as being
caused by the different bilateral characteristics of the trading countries as oppsed to
being solely caused by good-specific characteristics.
Together with the substitutability of transportation modes even at the HS10 level
documented above then suggests that agents minimize the costs across transportation
means associated with exporting a given good to a certain destination.
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Fact IV: Transportation Costs Vary Across Time
To understand the substitutability of different modes in response to the different cost
profiles documented above, it is necessary to observe some exogenous variation in
mode-specific trade costs. One source that reports such mode-specific charges are the
US Imports of Merchandise. This data set reports the charges paid for transportation
and insurance for each import separately from the total import value. Figure 7 plots
the average (across goods and exporters) ad-valorem equivalents of these charges for
air and sea transportation separately from 1995 to 2005. The time series plot shows that
there has been a considerable amount of variation in these charges over time. Most no-
ticeably, there was a large spike in air transportation charges in 2002. This spike is a
consequence of the tightened security measures after the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11th, 2001. This exogenous shock to transportation charges is what will inform the
estimation of the substitutability between different modes in the fourth section.
3. Modelling the Mode of Transportation
In this section I develop a model of international trade that incorporates a choice of
the mode of transportation and thus allows one to study mode-specific trade flows.
The model is a multi-country Ricardian framework based on Eaton and Kortum (2002)
(EK, henceforth) with a production structure similar to Alvarez and Lucas (2007).
3.1. The Economic Environment
Consider a world of i = 1, . . . , N countries, each with a measure Li of consumers. Each
consumer supplies one unit of labor inelastically and only has preferences over the
non-traded final good.
In each country, there is a representative firm producing this non-traded final good.
The firm has access to the following Cobb-Douglas production technology:
Qi = L
α
i,fq
1−α
i,f .
Here, Li,f is the amount of labor used in the production of the final good in country i,
α ∈ [0, 1] is the labor share, common across countries, and qi,f is an aggregate interme-
diate good. The firm’s objective is to minimize the production cost of producing Qi by
choosing labor and the aggregate intermediate input, taking prices as given. The price
of the final good is denoted byPi,f . The aggregate intermediate good is assembled from
a continuum of tradeable intermediate goods, qi(j), according to the CES aggregator
10
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qi =
(∫ 1
0
qi(j)
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
,
where σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution among the different varieties.
Each intermediate good j ∈ [0, 1] can be produced in each country under perfect
competition. To produce quantity qi(j) in country i, labor li and the aggregate interme-
diate good qi are combined according to
qi(j) = Xi(j)l
β
i q
1−β
i ,
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the labor share in intermediate good production. Across goods j pro-
duction technologies only differ by the productivity term Xi(j). Firms then minimize
the cost of supplying good j given the wage wi and the price of the aggregate interme-
diate Pi. Assuming free factor mobility within each country, the unit cost of the input
bundle for an intermediate variety j is identical for all varieties and given by
ci = Bw
β
i P
1−β
i ,
where B = β−β(1− β)1−β .
Because the intermediate goods are tradeable, firms will source their supply of in-
termediate j from the lowest cost supplier. I assume that trade across countries is sub-
ject to iceberg trade costs, so that an amount τ > 1 of a good needs to be shipped
for one unit to arrive.6 When choosing to source an intermediate variety from another
country, an importer can decide which of M different modes of transportation to use.
The price of intermediate j produced in country i and delivered to country n via mode
m is therefore
Pmni (j) =
ci
Xi(j)
τmni(j).
τmni(j) represents the iceberg trade cost. Not only does it depend on the origin country
i and destination n, but also on the mode m used for transportation and the variety j
being ordered. I assume that the trade cost can be decomposed into two components:
τmni(j) = τ
m
niτ
m
i (j).
τmni is a component that is independent of the good being shipped and only depends
on the mode of transportation and (n, i)-specific characteristics, such as geography.
6Commonly, this formulation is attributed to Samuelson (1954). However, von Thuenen (1826) already
proposes such a treatment of transportation costs albeit in an economic geography framework.
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τmi (j) represents the particular costs of shipping good j via mode m, independent of
the destination. This cost can vary across exporters. Examples for this cost would be
special packaging requirements or a good’s bulkiness that makes it more or less costly
to ship with mode m. Furthermore, different countries can have differing abilities at
adjusting good j to mode m, thus allowing τmi (j) to differ by exporter.
Since the focus here is on aggregate determinants of mode-specific transportation
costs, it is convenient to define an effective productivity Zmi (j) =
Xi(j)
τmi (j)
. This effective
productivity is an adjustment of the basic ability with which country i can produce
good j by its ability of preparing good j for transportation with mode m. The price of
delivering good j from country i to country n via mode m can then be rewritten as
Pmni (j) =
ci
Zmi (j)
τmni . (2)
When choosing from where and how to source good j, importers in country n will
choose the lowest cost supplier, so that the actual price of good j in country n is given
by
Pn(j) = min
i,m
Pmni (j). (3)
Note that in addition to choosing the lowest cost producer importers can now also
choose the mode of transportation. In this aggregate approach to modelling mode-
specific trade flows the benefits of using one mode over another exclusively stem from
a lower price, as evident in (3). I thus abstract from intertemporal motives of the trans-
portation choice as modeled in Hummels (2001) or Hummels and Schaur (2010). In-
stead, I treat them as components τmi (j) of which I only describe the aggregate behavior
through the particular distributional assumption on Zmi (j), to which I will turn next.
To facilitate the aggregation of these good-specific demands, I make an assumption
on the distribution of effective productivities Zmi (j). Because of the common compo-
nent Xi(j) these effective productivities are correlated over modes of transportation m
for a given variety j. Therefore, I assume that the vector Zi(j) = (Zmi (j))
M
m=1 is dis-
tributed according to
Fi(z) = exp
−Ti(M−1 M∑
m=1
(z−θm )
1
1−ρ
)1−ρ , (4)
where Ti > 0, θ > max{1, σ − 1}, and ρ ∈ [0, 1). M is the total number of transportation
modes available. It is helpful for the interpretation of this distribution to view it as
univariate marginals combined by a copula. In particular, (4) is the combination of
12
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Fre´chet marginals
u(z) = exp
[
−T z
−θ
M1−ρ
]
coupled by a Gumbel-Hougaard copula
ϕ(u(z)) = exp
−(∑
l
(− lnul(z))
1
1−ρ
)1−ρ ,
where u(z) = (ul(z))l. To verify this decomposition, plug the marginals back into the
copula to obtain (4). This decomposition shows that θ governs the dispersion of the
productivity draws. The larger θ, the lower the dispersion of productivities. Ti influ-
ences the mean productivity level: a higher Ti leads to larger productivity draws on
average. The association between the different mode-specific draws is entirely de-
termined by the copula. Nelsen (2006) shows that for this copula, ρ corresponds to
Kendall’s τ , a rank correlation statistic. For ρ = 0, the productivities are independent,
where as for ρ→ 1 the draws are perfectly dependent. I assume that the productivities
Zi(j) are independently distributed across countries.
A distribution similar to (4) is also mentioned by EK and used by Ramondo and
Rodriguez-Clare (2009) to describe productivities in a model of multinational produc-
tion, albeit without making the connection to copulas. The main difference is the pres-
ence of the norming factor M−1, which is crucial to include in the current framework.
Proposition 1 summarizes some important implications of the economic structure
as laid out above, the proof of which can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1. With the above economic structure,
i) the share of goods that n buys from i is given by
pini =
Φni
Φn
, (5)
where Φn =
∑
j Φnj and
Φnj = Tj(cjτnj)
−θ,
and
τnj =
[
1
M
∑
m
(τmnj)
− θ
1−ρ
] 1−ρ
θ
; (6)
ii) within the goods that n buys from i, the share that is being transported by modem
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is given by
γmni =
(τmni)
− θ
1−ρ∑
r(τ
r
ni)
− θ
1−ρ
; (7)
iii) the distribution of prices of goods actually sold by country i in countryn and shipped
via modem is independent of the source and the mode of transportation;
iv) the price index of the intermediate good aggregate in country n is given by
Pn = χΦ
− 1
θ
n (8)
with χ =
[
Γ
(
θ+1−σ
θ
)] 1
1−σ and Γ(·) being the gamma function.
To close the model I assume balanced trade.7 Following the same logic as in Alvarez
and Lucas (2007) and Waugh (2010), the wages can be solved for using
wiLi =
∑
j
wjLjpiji. (9)
Thus, for any given set of parameters, the endogenous prices wi and Pi can be solved
for using (8) and (9).
Property iii) of proposition 1 is instrumental in connecting the model’s parameters
to observed trade flows. Just as in EK, because the average spending in country n on
goods bought from country i and transported by mode m is equal over all sources and
modes, the fraction of goods country n buys from country i via mode m is also the
fraction of its expenditure on these goods:
Xmni
Xn
= γmnipini. (10)
Summing over m implies
Xni
Xn
= pini. (11)
At the same time,
Xmni
Xni
= γmni (12)
whereXmni is the c.i.f. value of goods that country n imports from country i via modem,
Xni =
∑
mX
m
ni and Xn =
∑
iXni. The share country n spends on goods from country i
7This is mostly an assumption of convenience. It would be easy to introduce trade imbalances between
countries as in Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2008).
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is larger the smaller country i’s relative input costs are, the better its relative technology,
and the smaller its aggregated mode-specific trade costs are. The mode-specific share,
however, is solely determined by the bilateral mode-specific trade cost relative to the
aggregated bilateral mode-specific trade costs.
3.2. A Closer Look at the Model
In this subsection I discuss several properties of the model. First, I explore the determi-
nants of the transportation choice. Then I show how the model nests Ricardian models
that study aggregate trade flows. Lastly, I discuss a simple welfare statistic and under
what circumstances this statistic is sufficient to deduce the gains from trade.
3.2.1. The Transportation Choice
To understand the choice of which mode country n uses when ordering its goods from
country i, it is useful to remember the trade-off for each individual good j in the set of
goods that n buys from i, Ωni. The possible prices of each good are given by
Pmni (j) =
ciτ
m
ni
Zmi (j)
, j ∈ Ωni.
The importers are trading off a higher effective productivity against the mode-specific
trade costs. Equation (7) shows for each mode m the fraction of goods transported by
that mode, i.e. the fraction of goods for which the trade-off was resolved in favor of
mode m. Because of property iii) of proposition 1, this is also equal to the fraction of
n’s expenditures on goods from i that are transported with mode m. Taking the ratio of
these expenditure shares for two modes, say air and vessel, gives
Xani
Xvni
=
(
τani
τvni
)− θ
1−ρ
. (13)
This shows that the elasticity of substitution between air and vessel shipments is gov-
erned both by θ and ρ. Using the copula interpretation of the multivariate Fre´chet dis-
tribution makes the interpretation of the elasticity parameter θ1−ρ clear. If θ is large, ef-
fective productivities are less dispersed. In that case, small differences in mode-specific
trade costs lead to larger changes in mode-specific trade flows. Similarly, if the corre-
lation between effective productivities is large – if the good specific components τmi (j)
do not play such a large role compared to the core productivity Xi(j) – mode-specific
productivities within a certain variety j are very similar, even if the dispersion of pro-
ductivities across varieties j may be large. Producers can then exploit the smallest dif-
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ferences between mode-specific transportation costs because it is cheap to fit the good
for another mode.
The mode-specific trade shares γmni derived in (7) show that in the model relative bi-
lateral mode-specific trade costs between countries determine the choice of the mode
of transportation. In particular, one exporter can have very different mode-specific
shares with each of his trade partners according to the bilateral mode-specific trade
costs between them. In this way, the model is able to capture differences that might
arise from different geographic characteristics of the modes of transportation: whereas
trucks and railroads might be very cheap for a destination close by, it seems reason-
able to expect ships to be the preferred means of transportation for longer distances as
already suggested by the naive gravity regressions in section two.
Looking at changes in mode-specific trade costs and the response of trade flows, it
follows from (10) that
∂ ln
(
Xmni
Xn
)
∂ ln τmni
= − θ
1− ρ(1− γ
m
ni)− θγmni(1− pini) < 0. (14)
An increase in trade costs for mode m will decrease country n’s spending on goods de-
livered by mode m from country i. This decrease happens at two margins. The first
margin is an internal substitution. At this margin the price change triggers a substi-
tution of modes away from m but keeping the source country i fixed. This is the first
summand on the right hand side. It shows that the elasticity is larger the smaller the
mode-specific share γmni is and the higher ρ. A high ρ means that the core productivity
term Xi(j) is the dominant determinant of Zmi (j). Thus, the modes are very close sub-
stitutes in terms of costs, and a small change in one mode’s trade costs triggers a large
change away from that mode. This margin is smaller if the mode-specific share γmni is
already high. A high mode-specific share means thatm is already the lowest cost mode
for delivering goods to n, which results in mode m dominating the composite trade
cost τni defined in (6). Changing the mode-specific trade cost, then, does not change
the relative price very much, so that the response of the mode-specific trade share X
m
ni
Xni
is small.
The second term represents the external margin. It shows the substitution away
from i as a supplier. As discussed above, a high γmni means that mode m dominates
the bilateral composite trade cost τni. Therefore, a change in the mode-specific trade
cost leads to a strong response of the bilateral composite trade cost, which is what de-
termines the share country n spends on goods from country i. Correspondingly, the
external margin is stronger the larger γmni is. Following a similar argument, if i is already
the main supplier for goods to n – represented through a high pini – a change in the trade
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cost does not change the relative prices very much, so that the elasticity of the external
margin is lower.
Lastly, both margins are influenced in the same way by θ. Remember that a larger
θ implies a lower variance of the distribution. Thus, there are smaller differences in
productivities. As a result, small changes result in larger substitutions of modes and
sources.
As for the overall change in flows between n and i we have
∂ ln
(
Xni
Xn
)
∂ ln τmni
= −θγmni(1− pini) (15)
which is exactly the external margin discussed above. Changing a mode-specific trade
cost should only affect goods that are being transported with that mode, so that the
external margin discussed in (14) is also the overall change in trade between i and n as
shown in (15).
Note that both elasticities are non-constant: they are non-linear and increasing in
the mode-specific trade share. Thus, phases of rapid changes in mode-specific trade
costs do not have to translate into rapid changes in trade flows if that mode has a very
low share. On the other hand, as the mode becomes more important and takes up a
larger share in the bilateral trade relationship smaller price changes can have larger
effects on trade flows. The introduction of Open Skies Agreements (OSAs) seems to
offer one example of this. Micco and Serebrisky (2006) are puzzled that OSAs result
in larger changes in trade flows for middle- and high-income countries than for low-
income countries. Since low-income countries have lower air shares (cf. Lux (2010)),
the present model would predict exactly such a difference.
3.2.2. Deconstructing Gravity
To derive the gravity equation in this model, define a country’s total sales as
Qi :=
∑
r
Xri =
∑
r
Φri
Xr
Φr
= c−θi Ti
∑
r
[
M−1
∑
m
(
(τmri )
−θ
) 1
1−ρ
]1−ρ
Xr
Φr︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Λi
.
Λi can be interpreted as country i’s market access. Using this and the definition of Φn
in (11) leads to the gravity equation
Xni =
XnQi
ΦnΛi
[
M−1
∑
m
(
(τmni)
−θ
) 1
1−ρ
]1−ρ
. (16)
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Trade between two countries is determined both by the importer’s total spending Xn
conditional on ΦnΛi and the exporter’s total sales Qi. The strength of the competition
in the import market, summarized through Φn, and the exporter’s market access, Λi,
influence trade negatively, as do geographic barriers τmni . The composite bilateral trade
cost τni defined in (6) can then be interpreted as a theoretically consistent aggregator
of mode-specific trade costs; it is the aggregate bilateral trade cost index. An interpre-
tation of approaches like EK or Waugh (2010) is that in modelling aggregate trade flows
they concentrate on modelling τni and ignore the aggregation implicitly involved. To
get a better understanding of the trade cost index τni, log-linearize (6) around τmni = 1:
ln τni =
∑
m
γmni ln τ
m
ni . (17)
According to the model, aggregate trade costs are approximately a weighted average
of the mode-specific trade costs where the weights are equal to the bilateral mode-
specific trade shares γmni. Note that (16) collapses to EK’s expression for τ
m
ni ≡ τni for all
m: if trade costs do not differ across the modes of transportation, then the two models
are identical.
Note that the gravity equation (16) is no longer log-linear in the trade costs, and in
particular no longer log-linear in distance. To the extent that distance influences the
modes differently, such a log-linear gravity expression is misspecified, as can also be
seen from (17).
3.2.3. A Sufficient Statistic Approach?
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2010) show that in most standard trade mod-
els it is possible to investigate the welfare gains from trade and also the gains from
a given change in trade costs through two simple statistics: the trade elasticity and
the share of expenditures on domestic goods. Their characterization of standard trade
models includes models in the tradition of EK and also Melitz (2003). However, the
present framework violates this characterization as long as changes in mode-specific
trade costs are concerned because the assumption of a common and constant trade
elasticity is violated.8 To see this, note that the trade elasticity is
∂ ln
(
Xmni
Xmnn
)
∂ ln τmni
= − θ
1− ρ(1− γ
m
ni)− θγmni.
8The restriction to mode-specific trade costs is important. Because the model nests EK, the arguments
of Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2010) go through even in the current framework as long as
only changes in the aggregate trade cost index τni are concerned.
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Whereas in standard trade models this elasticity is constant, and equal to −θ in EK, in
the disaggregated model this elasticity is dependent on the bilateral pair through γmni.
As a consequence the argument in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2010) that
allows them to reduce welfare gains to a function of the home expenditures and the
trade elasticity does not hold for ρ > 0. For ρ = 0, however, the expression collapses to
−θ and the argument is again applicable. The intuition is that in this case modes are not
more interdependent than individual countries; for the sake of the welfare gains, mode-
specific trade flows can be viewed as separate countries. What causes the breakdown of
their result is the fact that the substitution elasticities between modes within a country
and across countries can and do differ, as I will show in the next section.
4. Estimation
In this section I discuss the estimation of the model and present the results. Given the
non-linearity of the model already discussed in connection with the gravity equation,
the model’s estimation has to be based on a system of non-linear equations. I first
derive this system of equations and discuss the estimation strategy. Then I determine
θ and ρ, two parameters that have to be determined outside of the main estimation
procedure. Lastly, I present the results and discuss their robustness.
4.1. Estimating the Model
To determine the set of parameters to be estimated, I assume a log-linear form for the
mode-specific trade cost function. In particular, I assume
ln τmni = f
m
i + α
m
1 bni + α
m
2 lni + α
m
3 cni + α
m
k d
k,m
ni
= fmi +α
′
msni,
(18)
where the second line implicitly defines sni and αm. bni is a dummy variable that is
one if n and i share a common border, lni is a dummy that is one if n and i share a
common language, cni is a dummy that is one if n and i are on the same continent,
and dk,mni is one if the distance between countries n and i lies in the k-th interval. Note
that distance is a mode-specific regressor in the estimation: I use nautical distances for
trade by vessel and great circle distances for trade by air and surface. Nautical distances
measure the shortest path across water between the largest ports of any two countries
and are thus generally larger than great circle distances. Figure 8 plots the histogram
of the ratio of bilateral great circle distance to nautical distance. The histogram shows
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that the relative distances are concentrated around one, but that there is a substantial
left tail for which the great circle distance is much smaller than the nautical distance.
The nautical distances are from Feyrer (2009); see the data appendix for a more detailed
description of their construction. The effects on the other regressors are allowed to vary
by mode of transportation. fmi is a mode-exporter specific fixed effect in the trade cost
function. Its inclusion is motivated by the arguments in Waugh (2010).
The set of parameters to be estimated consists of the trade cost function parameters
αm and the fixed effects fmi for the three modes, the price index parameters Φi, and θ
and ρ. Conditional on θ and ρ, estimating the other parameters starts from (10). Some
simple algebra leads to
Xmni
Xn
Xi
Xii
= M−(1−ρ)
Φi
Φn
(τmni)
− θ
1−ρ
[∑
r
(τ rni)
− θ
1−ρ
]−ρ
∀m (19)
for a given country pair (n, i). Theoretically, it is possible to estimate the trade cost
and price index parameters based on this set of equations. But this requires that all
mode-specific trade flows are c.i.f. trade flows. Remember, though, that for every pair
of countries I observe the flows from the reporter to the partner as f.a.s. and the flows
from the partner to the reporter as c.i.f.9 Exploiting the assumption from above that the
observed component of trade costs does not depend on any good specific characteris-
tics, it holds that Xmni = τ
m
niY
m
ni , where Y
m
ni is f.a.s. spending on imports from country i
to country n via mode m. It is then possible to rewrite (19) as
Y mni
Xn
Xi
Xii
= M−(1−ρ)
Φi
Φn
(τmni)
− θ
1−ρ−1
[∑
r
(τ rni)
− θ
1−ρ
]−ρ
. (20)
Thus for every country pair in the sample I now have six equations: three for the flows
from the partner to the reporter, i.e. (19), and three for the other direction, i.e. (20).
To derive the actual equations used to estimate the model define
X˜mni = ln
(
Xmni
Xn
Xi
Xii
M1−ρ
)
and
Y˜ min = ln
(
Y min
Xi
Xn
Xnn
M1−ρ
)
.
Then for any tuple (n, i) there are three equations – for air, sea, and surface – with c.i.f.
trade flows and three equations with f.a.s. flows:
9Every country pair I observe must, of course, always consist of one reporter and one partner.
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X˜mni = ln Φi +
−θ
1− ρ (f
m
i +α
′
msni)− ρ ln
∑
r
exp
[ −θ
1− ρ (f
r
i +α
′
rsni)
]
− ln Φn + εmni (21)
and
Y˜ min = ln Φn+
( −θ
1− ρ − 1
)
(fmn +α
′
msni)−ρ ln
∑
r
exp
[ −θ
1− ρ (f
r
n +α
′
rsni])
]
− ln Φi+εmin, (22)
I jointly estimate this system via non-linear least squares. The Φi are captured through
fixed effects and so are the fmi . The sni only consist of observable components. The
parameters to be estimated are Φi, fmi , and αm. Because of the use of a spline for the
effect of distance, I normalize ΦUS and fmUS for allm to one and zero, respectively. θ and
ρ cannot be reliably estimated in this system of non-linear equations. Although they
are theoretically identified, I have found that the use of fixed effects to capture Φi and
fmi makes it impossible to estimate them reliably. I discuss the identification of them
in the next section.
Given the system of equations, define the error term as
u′ni :=
(
εani,c ε
v
ni,c ε
l
ni,c ε
a
ni,f ε
v
ni,f ε
l
ni,f
)
(23)
where the subscript c signals c.i.f. flows and f signals f.a.s. flows. I assume that uni ∼
(0,Ω) i.i.d. over the tuples (n, i). This assumption does not allow for any correlation of
trade flows of the same exporter or importer beyond the explicitly modelled correlation
through Φi or fmi . However, it does allow for an arbitrary correlation structure of the
flows between any two countries. Because θ and ρ are estimated parameters but are
used in the estimation of the system of equations, the asymptotic approximation to the
standard errors is incorrect. Instead, I determine the standard errors of the estimation
via bootstrapping. The bootstrap is based on B = 500 replications.
After having identified the parameter Φi, it is possible to identify Ti according to
Ti =
Xii
Xi
Φi
c−θi
, (24)
where the wages used to calculate ci are determined through the balanced trade con-
dition (9) using observed trade shares Xni/Xn as in Waugh (2010). The balanced trade
condition uses workforce data based on Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009); the exact
procedure is described in the data appendix. The price indices needed for ci are calcu-
lated using (8) and the estimated Φi.
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4.2. Determining θ and ρ
Estimating θ and ρ starts from (13). Taking logs of that expression gives
ln
(
Xani
Xvni
)
= − θ
1− ρ ln
(
τani
τvni
)
.
The problem with estimating − θ1−ρ is that τmni is generally unobserved. Using proxies
as in (18), however, does not allow a separate identification of the elements ofαm from
(18) and− θ1−ρ . As argued in section 2, the observable transportation charges contained
in the US Imports of Merchandise data set constitute a component of τmni and vary over
time.
In line with the trade cost function assumed in (18), one estimation approach would
be
ln
(
XaUS,i
XvUS,i
)
=
fai
fvi
+αδ ln
(
δaUS,i
δvUS,i
)
+α1bUS,i+α2lUS,i+α3cUS,i+α
a
kd
k,a
US,i+α
a
l d
l,v
US,i+ξUS,i, (25)
where ξUS,i is an error term assumed to satisfy the standard assumptions. The same
controls as in (18) are added since the transportation charges δmUS,i only represent part
of the overall trade costs. The charges δmUS,i are the ad-valorem equivalent of the import
charges reported in the data set. Comparing (18) and (25) it becomes clear that there
is no possibility of reliably estimating the exporter specific trade cost component fmi .
The problem is that there is no variation over the importer; the transportation charges
are only reported for the US as an importer. On the other hand, an estimation utilizing
the time dimension of the data would lead to inaccurate estimates given the relatively
short time span of 11 years. Assuming that fmi does not change over short horizons of
time, it is possible to improve on (25) by estimating it in a differenced form (I drop the
importer subscript to avoid cluttered notation):
∆ ln
(
Xai,t
Xvi,t
)
= αδ∆ ln
(
δai,t
δvi,t
)
+ ∆ξi,t, (26)
with ∆yt = yt − yt−1. This formulation assumes that the coefficients on time-invariant
proxies like contiguity and distance do not change over short intervals of time. Some
evidence for this assumption with respect to distance can be found in Disdier and Head
(2008). In this differenced form, the assumption on the error term is now (cf. Cameron
and Trivedi (2005))
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Et
[(
∆ ln
δai,t
δvi,t
∆ξi,t
)]
= 0, (27)
whereEt(·) denotes the conditional expectation on time t information. This estimation
approach is similar to the demand equation specification used by Broda and Weinstein
(2006) to estimate demand elasticities. But instead of specifying a supply equation, I
exploit the exogenous shock of the 9/11 attacks to identify the substitution elasticity as
discussed below.
Figure 9 shows the scatter plot of ∆ ln
(
Xai,t
Xvi,t
)
against ∆ ln
(
δai,t
δvi,t
)
, using annual data
from 1995 to 2005. The sample of exporters is the same country sample as the one
used in the main estimation. As predicted by the model, there is a negative relationship
between the two variables. Table 4 contains the regression results. The first column
contains the basic regression (26). The estimate for αδ is significant with a value of
−6.7. The result is quite robust to other specifications. The parameter estimate barely
changes when time fixed effects are included. This confirms that there are not different
growth rates of the two mode-specific trade values over this time period that could in-
fluence the result. One worry from the inspection of figure 9 is that the outliers might
dominate the result. To control for these outliers, column three reports the results of
an iterative least squares procedure that reweighs observations in each iteration de-
pending on their influence on the estimates. The results show that the outliers are not
driving the estimate of αδ. The estimate slightly increases for the robust procedure.
One further worry might be that the variation in transportation charges is not ex-
ogenous, i.e. that the identifying assumption (27) is violated. To investigate this furter
I estimate the coefficient by splitting the sample in pre-1999 and post-2000. The varia-
tion in the latter half is strongly driven by the increase in air transportation charges in
the wake of the 9/11 attacks documented in figure 7 and discussed above. The estima-
tion shows that the coefficient for these two sub-samples are -6.3 and -7, respectively,
which frame the estimate of -6.7 obtained using the whole sample.
Disentangling θ and ρ is more difficult. The difficulty of estimating the aggregate
trade elasticity is common to this class of Ricardian models (cf. EK and Waugh (2010)
but also Fieler (2009)). The original idea of EK to estimate θ is via an arbitrage condition
on goods’ prices in different countries. This condition states that
pn(l)
pi(l)
≤ τni ∀ l ∀n, i.
With this condition it is possible to estimate τni and thus obtain an estimate of θ inde-
pendent of the effects of geographic proxies. Simonovska and Waugh (2009) argue that
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this approach actually upward biases the estimate of θ because of the inherent bias in
the first-order statistic used to estimate τni. They correct for this bias in an EK model
and arrive at an estimate of θ = 4.22. This approach is not correct, however, if goods
can be transported with different modes of transportation. The reason is that the no-
arbitrage condition changes to
pn(l)
pi(l)
≤ min
m
τmni ∀ l ∀n, i.
Because minm τmni ≤ τni(τmni) where τni(τmni) is the choice-theoretically consistent trade
cost index derived above, they overestimate the true θ as it would be estimated using
the disaggregated model presented here. Thus, their estimate is an upper bound on the
value of the trade elasticity. EK suggest an alternative estimation procedure relying on
wage data instead of price data. This approach is valid in the current context, as well.
With this method they reach a value of θ = 3.6. This is generally considered to be a
lower bound on the parameter.
It turns out that the difference between the mode-specific trade costs is not very
large, so that minm τmni − τni(τmni) is likely to be small and the resulting remaining bias
in the estimate of Simonovska and Waugh (2009) as well. This suggests using a value of
θ = 4, which implies a ρ = 0.4 for an estimate of θ1−ρ of 6.7.
4.3. Estimation Results
I drop all zero trade flows from the sample.10 This leads to a drop of about 8.5% of
observations. The remaining sample contains 7308 observations, which are roughly
equally distributed over the six equations.
4.3.1. Model Fit
To understand the fit of the model I use the correlation between the model’s predicted
bilateral trade shares and the data. The correlations are reported in table 5. For the
aggregate bilateral trade share XniXn the correlation is 0.59. At this stage of aggregation the
model is essentially identical to EK in the formulation of Waugh (2010). As he discusses
in the paper, the fit of the model in explaining trade flows is very accurate measured
through the model’s R2. Stating the correlation measure here is meant to serve as an
anchor for evaluating the model’s ability to fit mode-specific trade flows.
Table 5 also reports the correlation between data and model predictions for mode-
10Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) investigate the potential sample selection bias introduced by
this method and find a negligible bias.
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specific trade shares X
m
ni
Xn
, i.e. the predicted γmni. Sea based trade shares have the highest
correlation with 0.65. The correlation for air shares is 0.6. The model’s fit is worst for
surface based trade flows; the correlation between predicted and actual trade shares
drops to 0.44. Given that the last is an agglomeration of several flows, this does not
seem too unexpected.
Comparing the fit for the bilateral aggregate trade share and the mode-specific trade
shares reveals that the model describes the mode-specific trade flows about as well as
the aggregate ones. Thus, an accurate description of mode-specific trade flows is possi-
ble even without concentrating on goods’ characteristics to explain the transportation
choice.
4.3.2. Parameter Estimates
Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients of the mode-specific trade cost functions for
contiguity, sharing a common language, and being on the same continent. The co-
efficient estimates are translated into ad-valorem cost equivalents using the relation
100 × (exp(αˆj) − 1). The reported significance levels are based on bootstrapped stan-
dard errors with 500 replications. In line with usual estimates of these coefficients (cf.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)) all three characteristics lead to a reduction in trade
costs. What is new here is the separation across modes of transportation. Not surpris-
ingly, sharing a common border has the strongest effect on surface transportation: it
lowers trade costs by 46.2% compared to just about 12.3% for trade by vessel. Air trans-
portation profits from a common border through a reduction of 21.8%. A common
language is most helpful in lowering trade costs for air transportation, surface based
transportation profits the least from it. However, the variation across modes is consid-
erably lower than compared to the estimates for contiguity. Being based on a common
continent is, not surprisingly, most helpful for surface based trade with a cost reduc-
tion of ca. 24% and least cost-reducing for shipping. The estimates are very precise
based on the reported significance levels. Overall, this deconstruction of the effects
of trade cost proxies into their differential effects through the modes of transportation
shows the large and intuitive heterogeneity that is lost in the usual aggregate approach
to estimating trade costs.
Figure 10 plots the estimated distance splines αˆmk over the distance categories. I
choose the mid-point of each interval on the x-axis. The intervals are reported in
table 7. They have been chosen such that roughly an equal amount of observations
falls into each category to maximize the precision of the estimates. The bands around
the splines are 95% confidence intervals. The confidence intervals are based on boot-
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strapped standard errors, as above. As for the other trade cost proxies, disaggregating
the effect of distance by the mode of transportation reveals a rich variation that seems
intuitive. Distance has the largest effect on surface based transportation, which seems
quite intuitive given that most of this category entails goods transported by trucks and
railroad. The effect on air transportation is relatively modest. Going from trade below
2500 km to over 11000 km raises air transportation costs only by about 69% compared to
177% for surface based transportation. Again, this seems very much in line with com-
mon intuition: once an airplane is in the air the marginal kilometer should be rather
cheap compared to a truck. The distance effect on shipping is somewhere in between
these two extremes. It rises in the beginning, but flattens off for larger distances.
Figure 11 plots the estimated exporter fixed effects in the trade cost function for
air transportation, fai , against the log of the GDP per capita. In line with what Waugh
(2010) finds there is a strong negative correlation between the two variables. Figure 12
and 13 plot the fixed effects for vessel and surface transportation, respectively, and the
same pattern emerges: rich countries face lower barriers to exporting and do so across
different modes of transportation. To further investigate the variation of the exporter
fixed effects, I calculate the coefficient of variation both within countries across modes
and across countries for each mode. The mean of the variation within countries and
across modes is 0.31 with a median of 0.25. The variation across countries is around
three times as large: 0.78 for air, 0.93 for sea, and 1.08 for surface transportation.
Figure 14 plots the estimated technology parameters Ti against GDP per capita. The
technologies are strongly positively associated with GDP per capita. This strong co-
variation is also found in Waugh (2010). Japan has the highest estimated technology
closely followed by Korea. The countries with the lowest technologies are predomi-
nantly African countries; Ghana has the lowest estimate.
4.3.3. Difference to an Aggregate Model
How different are the estimates from an aggregate model if the variation across modes
is as large as shown in table 6? To investigate the answer to this question, I simulate
aggregate trade flows using the estimates from the model. I then estimate an aggregate
specification just as in Waugh (2010) using these simulated data. The last row of table 6
reports the results from this experiment. Not surprisingly, the aggregate estimates lie in
between the disaggregated estimates. Figure 15 combines the distance estimates from
the disaggregated model with the estimates from the aggregated model. As in the case
of the trade cost function parameters, the aggregate distance effect is a combination of
the effects of the three modes. There are two things to note about the results.
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First, the large aggregate contiguity effect is what Overman, Redding, and Venables
(2004) and Hummels (2007) call the puzzling fact that most countries tend to trade with
their neighbors. Disaggregating the model and estimating mode-specific trade costs
reveals that the contiguity effect is largely driven by surface trade. From this observa-
tion, one plausible explanation of this effect might be based on different transporta-
tion economies of scale associated with the different modes. Assume that the different
economies of scale are captured in large fixed transportation costs associated with mar-
itime trade and much smaller fixed transportation costs for surface trade. Then many
more small shipments will be send via surface transportation whereas only sufficiently
large shipments are traded between countries where maritime trade is the cheaper op-
tion. The estimates show that surface trade is only feasible for short distances; the
distance profile is much steeper for surface than for the other modes. If the amount
of small shipments is a sufficiently large share of overall trade flows, this mechanism
could generate the large estimated contiguity effect.
The second interesting thing to note concerns the disaggregated distance profiles in
figure 15. There is a sense in the gravity literature that distance only matters for shorter
distances and not so much for larger distances. The disaggregated estimates show that
this is the combination of surface trade having both a large distance elasticity and being
predominantly used for regional trade with neighbors or on the same continent. This
leads to a sharp increase in the aggregate estimate of the distance effect. For larger dis-
tances, however, the other two modes become more dominant and the distance effect
is dominated by the distance profile of air and vessel. The estimates show that trade in
these modes reacts much less to distance which leads to the observed flattening of the
aggregate distance effect.
4.4. Robustness
In this subsection I discuss some additional results that are meant to highlight the ro-
bustness of the benchmark estimation.
4.4.1. Weighted NLS
The benchmark estimation is not efficient since it does not explicitly exploit the as-
sumed correlation structure of Ω. To determine whether a weighted NLS procedure
would yield more efficient – and generally different – estimates, I re-estimate the model.
At this second step I use a weighted NLS procedure, where the estimate of Ω is based
on the residuals uˆni. The standard error of the regression when comparing the weighted
and the unweighted estimate are virtually indistinguishable. The sample is large enough
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for there to be no efficiency loss to the unweighted procedure.
4.4.2. The Importance of ρ
To determine the sensitivity of the estimates with respect to ρ, I re-estimate the model
with two different values of ρ: ρ = 0.2 and ρ = 0.6, keeping θ = 4. Table 8 reports
the resulting correlations between predicted mode-specific shares X
m
ni
Xn
and the data.
The correlations barely change with the different values of ρ, which hints at it being
poorly identified in the model itself. Note that Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2009)
experience a very similar result in their model of multinational production, using a
very similar correlated Fre´chet distribution.
4.4.3. Great Circle Distances
The benchmark model uses actual nautical distances for the maritime trade flows. It
seems clear that in many cases the great circle distance is only a poor proxy for the
distance actually travelled by a ship. Indeed, the discussion of figure 8 above has al-
ready established the extent of this difference in the data set. However, it is much less
clear what implications this difference in distances has for the study of trade flows.
In order to determine the quantitative importance of this difference, I re-estimate the
model using only great circle distances. The fit of the model is basically unchanged; the
standard error of the regression is only 0.7% larger. Table 9 shows the results for the co-
efficients of the trade cost function. Although there are some differences between the
two models, they all are extremely minor. Figure 16 plots the resulting distance effects
of the different modes. Here, there is basically no change with respect to surface or air
transportation. On this metric, maritime trade has the lowest distance sensitivity of all
modes. For distances beyond 6000 km, the distance effects of air and vessel transporta-
tion are basically indistinguishable. The fact that the relative distance effects become
more similar with increasing distance means that the air share grows relative to their
vessel share: more distant partners have higher air shares relative to the vessel shares
than closer partners. This is reminiscent of the effects Harrigan (2009) finds. Here, how-
ever, this effect occurs at a more aggregate level and for a wider sample of countries.
5. Two Counterfactuals
Before discussing the counterfactuals, some as yet unspecified parameters have to be
determined. Since these parameters are not readily estimateable from the data I choose
to calibrate them in line with previous work. Table 10 summarizes these parameters
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and the values I choose. β is the value added share in intermediate good production.
Using data on value added and gross manufacturing production from the UNIDO data I
calculate a value of 0.31 for the countries in my sample. Waugh (2010) uses a minimally
larger share of 0.33. σ is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate varieties.
The value does not play any role other than in the constant χ of the price index and
only needs to satisfy the restriction θ > max{1, σ − 1}. I choose σ = 4.5. α controls
value added in the final good production. Alvarez and Lucas (2007) discuss plausible
values in the range of 0.7 to 0.8. I follow Waugh (2010) and pick α = 0.75.
5.1. The Role of Transportation
In the first series of counterfactuals I take the benchmark model as estimated above
and compare this to worlds in which one of the three modes is not available. The aim
of the counterfactual is to try to understand the contribution of each individual mode
to the gains from trade. To gauge this contribution, I calculate for each counterfactual
the statistic
∆i,m =
ωi,m
ωi
− 1
ωi,aut
ωi
− 1 . (28)
ωi =
wi
Pi,f
denotes the real wage of country i in the benchmark case, ωi,m denotes the real
wage when mode m is made prohibitively expensive, and ωi,aut is the real wage under
autarky. The statistic ∆i,m denotes the fraction of the gains from trade that are foregone
if mode m is eliminated. Figures 17 to 19 show a scatter plot of these statistics against
(log) GDP per capita for the three different modes along with the best fit lines. Figure 17
shows that richer countries rely slightly more heavily on air transportation for realizing
their gains from trade. But the slope of this relationship is rather small. Furthermore,
it shows that most countries do not rely very much on trade by air. The gains from
trade would be on average only 8% lower if air transportation was impossible. Figure
18 shows that the picture is very different for trade by sea. First, the importance of sea
transportation is large for most countries: gains from trade would be on average 34%
lower if sea transportation was not possible. Furthermore, the relation with a country’s
development level is reversed. Poor countries rely much more heavily on access to sea
transportation than rich countries. The reason for this becomes clear when looking
at the role played by surface transportation in realizing gains from trade as depicted
in figure 19. This figure makes clear that rich countries rely more heavily on surface
transportation than poor countries.
The intuition for this pattern is best understood by thinking about European and
29
DEFYING GRAVITY
African countries. If European countries’ access to far-away markets is made more ex-
pensive by eliminating air transportation, some trade will shift towards neighboring
countries. But for European countries, these are still technologically advanced markets
that offer many opportunities to exploit comparative advantages. Thus, the second-
best price for most goods will not be much higher than it was and the welfare gains
from trade are not strongly influenced. The story is different for African countries. If
African countries are forced to trade more with their neighbors because long-distance
trade has become more expensive, this means going from trading with technologically
advanced but far-away markets to trading with close but technologically much less ad-
vanced markets. This results in sharply increasing prices for goods and thus a larger
negative change in the real wage.
This counterfactual highlights the role of different modes of transportation in over-
coming the adverse distribution of technological achievements across the globe. Tech-
nologically advanced countries are bunched together and so are technologically dis-
advantaged countries. As a result, the poor countries rely on long-distance modes of
transportation to profit from trade much more heavily than rich countries.
Whereas the discussion so far has focused on relative gains from the modes, table 11
summarizes the level effects. The first column shows that the average welfare change
across modes is very different. Shutting off air transportation decreases the average real
wage by only 0.8% whereas shutting off sea or surface transportation has much larger
effects: -2.9% and -2.4%, respectively. Note that these changes do not add up to the
average loss of 11% when going to autarky. The reason is the strong substitutability. To
highlight this, the second column shows the drop in world trade. Comparing this to
the share of world trade transported by each affected mode prior to the counterfactual
in column three shows that the drop is always much smaller. That is, a lot of trade is
actually retained and shifts to other modes of transportation.
5.2. The Role of Transportation in Decreasing Income Differences
Recently, Waugh (2010) has argued that exporter-specific fixed effects in the trade cost
functions can explain up to 30% of income differences. Given the strong substitutabil-
ity of transportation modes highlighted in the first set of counterfactuals, I now ex-
amine the ability of mode-specific exporter fixed effects to account for income differ-
ences. To do this, I compare income differences in the benchmark model to a model
where I reduce the mode-specific fixed effects in the trade cost functions to the US
level for a particular mode. That is, I set fmi = min{fmi , fmUS}. Table 12 shows the re-
sulting changes in income differences, measured as the variance of the log of the real
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wage. The results show that reducing the exporter specific barriers for either air or
sea transportation reduces income differences by about 35% in the sample. Reducing
the barrier for surface transportation only reduces income differences by a little over
20%. The difference is easily understood with the intution already developed above.
As discussed in Waugh (2010), the reduction of income differences through a reduc-
tion of asymmetries in trade costs is caused by poor countries starting to import a lot
more goods to compensate for their technological disadvantage. But if the asymmetry
is reduced in surface transportation, poor countries can only trade more cheaply with
other countries nearby, which are mostly technologically disadvantaged, as well. If, on
the other hand, the asymmetries are reduced in long-distance modes like air or sea
transportation, poor countries can access technologically advanced far-away markets
and thus exploit much larger gains from trade. The last column shows that reducing
all mode-specific exporter fixed effects simultaneously reduces income differences by
about 40%, only slightly more than in the case of air or sea transportation. Again, be-
cause the substitutability between different transportation modes is so strong, reduc-
ing the asymmetries in only one long-distance mode already allows countries to realize
large additional gains from trade.
To put these numbers in perspective, I determine the reduction of income differ-
ences achieved in a world of free trade, i.e. where τmni ≡ 1 for all modes m. In such a
world, income differences shrink to about 40% of what they are in the benchmark case.
Thus, reducing the exporter specific barriers in sea transportation alone achieves half
the reduction in income differences compared to a world of free trade.
As a further check I calculate the change in income differences resulting from re-
ducing the fixed effect to the minimum within each country. The results are reported
in the third column. This exercise is meant to show that the reduction in income dif-
ferences does not come from the reduction of within country variation of these fixed
effects but really from the much larger across country variation in export barriers.
6. Conclusion
In this paper I have developed and estimated a model of mode-specific international
trade flows to study the role played by individual modes of transportation in interna-
tional trade and the effects of changes to mode-specific as opposed to aggregate trade
costs. Although the model is able to accomodate any number of transportation modes,
I concentrate on the three most important ones: air, sea, and surface transportation.
I estimate the model using a novel data set. The resulting estimates of the trade cost
functions are quite intuitive, showing that air and vessel transportation are impor-
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tant for long-distance trade and surface transportation mostly used for short-distance
trade.
I then use counterfactual analysis to show two things. First, I decompose the gains
from trade into their mode-specific components. To do this I compare the benchmark
model to a world where one mode is prohibitively expensive. The most important les-
son is that modes are strongly substitutable: even removing the possibility to trade by
sea, the most widely used mode, reduces welfare on average by only about 3% com-
pared to the average loss of 11% when moving to autarky. The second implication is the
different importance of transportation modes for different countries. Poor countries
rely much more heavily on access to long-distance transportation in realizing gains
from trade than rich countries. The reason lies in the geographic distribution of tech-
nologies. Since rich and poor countries form clusters on the globe, eliminating long-
distance trade for rich countries is not as damaging as removing it for poor countries.
Rich countries can substitute much of their trade towards their neighbors who are still
technologically advanced enough to exploit large gains from trade. Poor countries, on
the other hand, face a much steeper price increase when forced to trade more with their
technologically disadvantaged neighbors.
In a second counterfactual I investigate the role of individual modes of transporta-
tion in reducing income differences. The high substitutability estimated implies that
removing asymmetries in air or sea transportation alone can reduce income differences
in the sample by about 35%. In comparison, moving to a world of free trade reduces in-
come differences by about 60%.
One limitation of the model developed here is that it is static. However, there is ev-
idence that the delivery time matters for international trade, cf. Evans and Harrigan
(2005) or Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2008). An interesting avenue for future
research would thus be to study the role of different transportation modes in inter-
national trade in a dynamic context. The considerable challenge here is to generalize
these dynamic trade models to a multi-country framework.
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A Data Appendix
A1. Gross Manufacturing Production
The data for gross manufacturing production come from three different sources. If available, I use the
UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database 2008.11 However, these data are not available for all countries in the
sample. Where necessary, I supplement the data with gross manufacturing production from the OECD
STAN database12 or impute it with UN National Accounts Statistics on value added in manufacturing.13
Exchange rate adjustments for the OECD data are made using the exchange rates from the Penn World
Tables 6.3.
A2. Trade Data
To limit the trade flows to manufacturing I employed the concordance suggested in Maskus (1991).
Mode-Specific Trade Data: The data for bilateral trade flows disaggregated by the mode of trans-
portation come from two sources. The data on flows involving the U.S. are from the US Imports/Exports
of Merchandise. The second data source is the XTNET data base from Eurostat.14 To convert the trade data
quoted in Euro into US dollars, I use the exchange rates as reported in the Penn World Tables, edition 6.3.
Aggregate Trade Data: Trade data on aggregate trade flows are from the update data set based on
Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997).
A3. Geographic Data
The geographic data used for the trade cost function all come from the CEPII data base.15 The great circle
distance is measured in kilometers.
The data for bilateral nautical distances have been generously provided by James Feyrer. For details
of the calculation of these distances, see Feyrer (2009). The data set reports bilateral distances as days for
a round trip. To convert them into kilometers, I assume a vessel operating 24 hours per day at 20 knots.
A4. Labor Force Data
Using data on GDP per capita, population, and GDP per worker, the labor force for each country in the
sample is recovered as in Caselli (2005). The data are from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2009).
B Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is based on arguments similar to the ones in Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2009). First, note
that the distribution of prices for goods n buys from i is given by
11http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=o3472
12http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3343,en 2649 34445 21573686 1 1 1 1,00.html
13http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/Introduction.asp
14http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb/
15http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
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Gni(p) := P[Pni(j) ≤ p] = 1− P [∀m : Pmni(j) ≥ p]
= 1− P
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p
]
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−Φnipθ
]
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With this, the price distribution of goods in n is
Gn(p) = 1−
∏
i
(1−Gni(p)) = 1− exp[−Φnpθ]. (B.3)
where Φn =
∑
i Φni. Now, since Gni(p) is independent across i, the same reasoning as in EK leads to the
conclusion that the measure of goods n buys from i is equal to
pini =
Φni
Φn
. (B.4)
This proves (5). To see what share n buys from i via mode m, let us focus on one particular mode, say
m = a. Then the share is the mass of prices for which
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m
nl
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Zai (j) ∀m∀ l
(B.5)
Define the set A as the above event. Also, define anl,m =
clτ
m
nl
c1τ
a
n1
and set, without loss of generality, i = 1.
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because− x
1−x = 1− 11−x and
F (dx11, x21, . . . , xMN ) =
θ
M
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−
∑
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dx11. (B.7)
Now Φn1
Φn
is the share of goods n buys from i = 1, so
γan1 :=
(τan1)
− θ
1−ρ∑
m(τ
m
n1)
− θ
1−ρ
(B.8)
is the share of goods n buys from i = 1 that are transported via mode m = a. This proves (7). Then the
distribution of prices in n for goods that are actually imported from country i = 1 with mode m = a is
P [{P an1(j) ≤ p} | {P an1(j) ≤ Pmnl (j) ∀m∀ l}] = P [{P
a
n1(j) ≤ p} ∩ {P an1(j) ≤ Pmnl (j) ∀m∀ l}]
P [{P an1(j) ≤ Pmnl (j) ∀m∀ l}]
=
1
P(A)
P
[
{Za1 (j) ≥ c1τ
a
n1
p
} ∩ {Zml (j) ≤ clτ
m
nl
c1τan1
Zal (j) ∀m∀ l}
]
=
1
P(A)
∫ ∞
c1τ
a
n1
p
F (dz, . . . , anl,mz, . . .)
=
1
P(A)
exp
[
−Φn(c1τan1)θz−θ
]∣∣∣∞c1τan1
p
= 1− exp[−Φnpθ]
= Gn(p).
(B.9)
This proves the third claim. Applying once again the same logic as in EK, it can then be shown that
Pn =
[
Γ
(
θ + 1− σ
θ
)] 1
1−σ
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χ
Φ
− 1
θ
n . (B.10)
This proves (8).
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Figure 2: Structure of the combined data set of mode-specific trade flows. Trade is only observed between
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Figure 3: The graph shows the median share of exports by air against the (log) GDP per capita. The solid
line shows the best fit.
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Figure 4: The graph shows the median share of exports by sea against the (log) GDP per capita. The solid
line shows the best fit.
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Figure 5: The graph shows the median share of exports by surface transportation against the (log) GDP
per capita. The solid line shows the best fit.
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Figure 6: The Herfindahl index of mode-specific US export shares per HS 10 commodity. Data are from
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Figure 8: The histogram of the ratio of bilateral great circle distance to bilateral nautical distance.
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Figure 10: αˆmk against the mid point of the k-th distance interval. The bounds around the estimates are
95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard errors.
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Figure 11: Estimated fˆai against the log of GDP per capita.
ARG
AUS
BEL
BEN
BGD
BGR
BRA CAN
CHL
CHN
CMR
COL
CRI
CYP
DEU
DNK
DOM
ECU
EGY
ESP
EST
FIN
FRAGBR
GHA
GRC
GTM
HND
IDN
IND
IRL
IRN
ISL
ISR
ITA
JAM
JOR
JPN
KEN
KOR
KWT
LKA
LTU
LVAMAR MEX
MLT
MOZ
MUS
MYS
NIC
NLD
NOR
NZL
OMN
PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
POL
PRT
QAT
ROU RUS
SEN
SLV
SVN
SWE
SYR
TGO
THA
TUN
TUR
UKR
URY
USA
VEN
VNM
ZAF
−
1
0
1
2
Ex
po
rte
r F
E 
(S
ea
)
7 8 9 10 11
(log) GDP per capita
Exporter FE (Sea) vs. (log) GDP per capita
Figure 12: Estimated fˆvi against the log of GDP per capita.
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Figure 13: Estimated fˆsi against the log of GDP per capita.
ARG
AUS
BEL
BEN
BGD
BGR
BRA
CAN
CHL
CHN
CMR
COL
CRI
CYP
DEU
DNK
DOM
ECU
EGY
ESP
EST
FIN
FRA
GBR
GHA
GRC
GTM
HND
IDN
IND
IRL
IRN
ISLISR
ITA
JAM
JOR
JPN
KEN
KOR
KWT
LKA
LTU
LVA
MAR
MEX
MLT
MOZ
MUS
MYS
NIC
NLD
NOR
NZL
OMN
PAK
P N
PER
PHL
POL PRT
QAT
ROU
RUS
SEN
SLV
SVN
SWE
SYR
TGO
THA
TUN
TUR
UKR
U Y
USA
VEN
VNM
ZAF
−
8
−
6
−
4
−
2
0
2
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
7 8 9 10 11
(log) GDP per capita
Technology Estimates vs. (log) GDP per capita
Figure 14: Estimated Tˆi against the log of GDP per capita.
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Figure 15: αˆmk against the mid point of the k-th distance interval together with the distance estimates from
an aggregate model. The distance for air, surface, and the aggregate estimate is the great circle distance,
whereas the vessel estimate is plotted against bilateral nautical distance.
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Figure 16: αˆmk against the mid point of the k-th distance interval. The estimates are obtained using only
great circle distance.
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Figure 17: Plotting ∆i,m for air transportation by country against (log) GDP pc. See (28) for a definition.
The straight line is the best fit.
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Figure 18: Plotting ∆i,m for sea transportation by country against (log) GDP pc. See (28) for a definition.
The lines are best fit lines.
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Figure 19: Plotting ∆i,m for surface transportation by country against (log) GDP pc. See (28) for a defini-
tion. The lines are best fit lines.
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Table 1: Mode-Specific Bilateral Shares
Mean CV 25% 75%
Air 20.8% 115.7% 2.6% 29.7%
Sea 60.3% 49.5% 38.7% 85.7%
Land 18.9% 137.7% 0.5% 26.6%
Notes: Summary statistics of the bilateral
mode-specific trade shares for the countries
contained in the sample. The sample year is
2005.
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Table 2: Naive Gravity Regressions
The Modes
Regressors Air Sea Surface
(log) GDP pc Imp. 1.57∗∗ 1.28∗∗ 1.21∗∗
(log) Pop. Imp. 1.04∗∗ 0.89∗∗ 0.83∗∗
(log) GDP pc Exp. 2.45∗∗ 1.56∗∗ 1.35∗∗
(log) Pop. Exp. 1.23∗∗ 1.17∗∗ 1.13∗∗
(0, 2500] – – –
(2500, 4000] −0.45∗ −0.84∗∗ −2.35∗∗
(4000, 5000] −0.48∗ −1.05∗∗ −2.46∗∗
(5000, 6000] −0.61∗∗ −1.11∗∗ −2.1∗∗
(6000, 7000] −0.53∗∗ −1.54∗∗ −2.65∗∗
(7000, 8000] −0.63∗∗ −1.34∗∗ −2.48∗∗
(8000, 9000] −0.59∗∗ −1.34∗∗ −2.4∗∗
(9000, 10000] −0.47∗ −1.4∗∗ −2.34∗∗
(10000, 11000] −0.96∗∗ −1.95∗∗ −2.84∗∗
(11000,∞) −1.52∗∗ −1.77∗∗ −2.75∗∗
Com. Language 1.31∗∗ 0.91∗∗ −0.28
Contiguous −0.51 −0.72 2.6∗∗
Com. Continent 0.13 0.05 0.92∗∗
Constant −60.78∗∗ −43.59∗∗ −40.2∗∗
R2 0.71 0.69 0.52
No. Obs. 2477 2487 2212
Notes: Results of the estimation of (1) using robust
standard errors. ∗∗ denotes significance at the 1% level,
∗ denotes significance at the 5% level.
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Table 3: Value Shares in Exports
Mode-Specific Share Threshold
> 0.995 > 0.99 > 0.98 > 0.95
Value Share in Exports 0.6% 1% 1.8% 4.9%
Notes: The aggregate value share of exported goods with one
good-specific mode-specific share above the given threshold. Data are
from the US Exports of Merchandise. A good is a HS10 classification.
Table 4: Estimation of−θ/(1− ρ)
OLS OLS Robust ≤ 1999 ≥ 2000
− θ1−ρ −6.7 −6.7 −6.9 −6.3 −7
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Time Effect no yes no no no
No. Obs 775 775 775 308 390
R2 0.19 0.25 – 0.19 0.22
Notes: Estimates of equation (26). p-values are given in
parentheses.
Table 5: Correlations of Predicted Shares and Data
Modes
Air Sea Land Aggregate
Correlation 0.6 0.65 0.46 0.58
Notes: Correlations of predicted bilateral
mode-specific trade shares, X̂mni/Xn, and data,
Xmni/Xn and for aggregate bilateral trade shares.
48
DEFYING GRAVITY
Table 6: Trade Cost Estimates
Contiguity Common Language Common Continent
Air −21.8%∗∗ −20.6%∗∗ −18.7%∗∗
Sea −12.3%∗ −15.8%∗∗ −10.6%∗∗
Surface −46.2%∗∗ −11.6%∗∗ −23.9%∗∗
Aggr. −40.3%∗∗ −16.9%∗∗ −16.5%∗∗
Notes: Estimates of the mode-specific trade cost functions expressed as
ad-valorem equivalents. The last two rows report the values from estimating an
aggregate model with data simulated according to the model. ∗∗ denotes
significance at the 1% level, ∗ denotes significance at the 5% level. The
standard errors are based on bootstrapped standard errors.
Table 7: The Distance Intervals
Air & Surface Vessel
[0, 2500) [0, 5000)
[2500, 4000) [5000, 7500)
[4000, 5000) [7500, 9000)
[5000, 6000) [9000, 105000)
[6000, 7000) [105000, 12000)
[7000, 8000) [12000, 13500)
[8000, 9000) [13500, 16500)
[9000, 10000) [16500,∞)
[10000, 11000)
[11000,∞)
Notes: The distance intervals
used in the paper. Air and
surface uses great circle
distance, vessel transportation
is in nautical distances.
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Table 8: Robustness with respect to ρ
Air Sea Land
Mode-Specific Shares (ρ = 0.4) 0.6 0.65 0.46
Mode-Specific Shares (ρ = 0.2) 0.53 0.61 0.52
Mode-Specific Shares (ρ = 0.6) 0.59 0.64 0.48
Notes: Correlations of predicted bilateral mode-specific trade
shares, X̂mni/Xn, and data, X
m
ni/Xn for different values of ρ.
ρ = 0.4 is the benchmark case.
Table 9: Trade Cost Estimates for Great Circle Distance
Contiguity Common Language Common Continent
Air −22%∗∗ −19.9%∗∗ −12%∗
Sea −14.6%∗∗ −15.6%∗∗ −5.6%
Surface −46%∗∗ −10.9%∗∗ −17.7%∗∗
Notes: Estimates of the mode-specific trade cost functions using great circle
distance for all modes. The last two columns report the values from estimating
an aggregate model with data simulated according to the model. ∗∗ denotes
significance at the 1% level, ∗ denotes significance at the 5% level, and a
denotes significance at the 10% level. Standard errors are bootstrapped.
Table 10: Calibrated Parameters
Value Source
β 0.31 UNIDO
σ 4.5 σ < θ + 1
α 0.75 Alvarez and Lucas (2007)
Notes: Values for the parameters of the
model that are calibrated.
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Table 11: Summary Statistics of the Role of Transportation
Aggr. Trade
Counterfactual Avg. Welfare Change X˜/X Xr/X
Air −0.8% 94.9% 87.8%
Sea −2.9% 64.7% 44%
Surface −2.4% 80.2% 68.3%
Autarky −11.1% 0% –
Notes: X denotes total world trade and X˜ denotes total world
trade in the counterfactual. Xr is the total trade of the unaffected
modes prior to the counterfactual.
Table 12: Real Wage Differences relative to Benchmark
Counterfactual Air Sea Surface All
fmi = f
m
US 66.4% 64.3% 78% 60.7%
τmni ≡ 1 – – – 39.3%
fmi = minl f
l
i 99.2% 98.3% 100.5% 99%
Notes: Ratios of the variances of log real wages. The
variance of the log of the real wage in the benchmark case is
0.21.
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